diff --git a/.claude/skills/auth-implementation-patterns/.openskills.json b/.claude/skills/auth-implementation-patterns/.openskills.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ed80f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/auth-implementation-patterns/.openskills.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "source": "/tmp/skill-selector-curated-3423638041", + "sourceType": "local", + "localPath": "/tmp/skill-selector-curated-3423638041/auth-implementation-patterns", + "installedAt": "2026-04-07T00:45:24.777Z" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.claude/skills/auth-implementation-patterns/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/auth-implementation-patterns/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09d8e60 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/auth-implementation-patterns/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,638 @@ +--- +name: auth-implementation-patterns +description: Master authentication and authorization patterns including JWT, OAuth2, session management, and RBAC to build secure, scalable access control systems. Use when implementing auth systems, securing APIs, or debugging security issues. +--- + +# Authentication & Authorization Implementation Patterns + +Build secure, scalable authentication and authorization systems using industry-standard patterns and modern best practices. + +## When to Use This Skill + +- Implementing user authentication systems +- Securing REST or GraphQL APIs +- Adding OAuth2/social login +- Implementing role-based access control (RBAC) +- Designing session management +- Migrating authentication systems +- Debugging auth issues +- Implementing SSO or multi-tenancy + +## Core Concepts + +### 1. Authentication vs Authorization + +**Authentication (AuthN)**: Who are you? + +- Verifying identity (username/password, OAuth, biometrics) +- Issuing credentials (sessions, tokens) +- Managing login/logout + +**Authorization (AuthZ)**: What can you do? + +- Permission checking +- Role-based access control (RBAC) +- Resource ownership validation +- Policy enforcement + +### 2. Authentication Strategies + +**Session-Based:** + +- Server stores session state +- Session ID in cookie +- Traditional, simple, stateful + +**Token-Based (JWT):** + +- Stateless, self-contained +- Scales horizontally +- Can store claims + +**OAuth2/OpenID Connect:** + +- Delegate authentication +- Social login (Google, GitHub) +- Enterprise SSO + +## JWT Authentication + +### Pattern 1: JWT Implementation + +```typescript +// JWT structure: header.payload.signature +import jwt from "jsonwebtoken"; +import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express"; + +interface JWTPayload { + userId: string; + email: string; + role: string; + iat: number; + exp: number; +} + +// Generate JWT +function generateTokens(userId: string, email: string, role: string) { + const accessToken = jwt.sign( + { userId, email, role }, + process.env.JWT_SECRET!, + { expiresIn: "15m" }, // Short-lived + ); + + const refreshToken = jwt.sign( + { userId }, + process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET!, + { expiresIn: "7d" }, // Long-lived + ); + + return { accessToken, refreshToken }; +} + +// Verify JWT +function verifyToken(token: string): JWTPayload { + try { + return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!) as JWTPayload; + } catch (error) { + if (error instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError) { + throw new Error("Token expired"); + } + if (error instanceof jwt.JsonWebTokenError) { + throw new Error("Invalid token"); + } + throw error; + } +} + +// Middleware +function authenticate(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) { + const authHeader = req.headers.authorization; + if (!authHeader?.startsWith("Bearer ")) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "No token provided" }); + } + + const token = authHeader.substring(7); + try { + const payload = verifyToken(token); + req.user = payload; // Attach user to request + next(); + } catch (error) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid token" }); + } +} + +// Usage +app.get("/api/profile", authenticate, (req, res) => { + res.json({ user: req.user }); +}); +``` + +### Pattern 2: Refresh Token Flow + +```typescript +interface StoredRefreshToken { + token: string; + userId: string; + expiresAt: Date; + createdAt: Date; +} + +class RefreshTokenService { + // Store refresh token in database + async storeRefreshToken(userId: string, refreshToken: string) { + const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); + await db.refreshTokens.create({ + token: await hash(refreshToken), // Hash before storing + userId, + expiresAt, + }); + } + + // Refresh access token + async refreshAccessToken(refreshToken: string) { + // Verify refresh token + let payload; + try { + payload = jwt.verify(refreshToken, process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET!) as { + userId: string; + }; + } catch { + throw new Error("Invalid refresh token"); + } + + // Check if token exists in database + const storedToken = await db.refreshTokens.findOne({ + where: { + token: await hash(refreshToken), + userId: payload.userId, + expiresAt: { $gt: new Date() }, + }, + }); + + if (!storedToken) { + throw new Error("Refresh token not found or expired"); + } + + // Get user + const user = await db.users.findById(payload.userId); + if (!user) { + throw new Error("User not found"); + } + + // Generate new access token + const accessToken = jwt.sign( + { userId: user.id, email: user.email, role: user.role }, + process.env.JWT_SECRET!, + { expiresIn: "15m" }, + ); + + return { accessToken }; + } + + // Revoke refresh token (logout) + async revokeRefreshToken(refreshToken: string) { + await db.refreshTokens.deleteOne({ + token: await hash(refreshToken), + }); + } + + // Revoke all user tokens (logout all devices) + async revokeAllUserTokens(userId: string) { + await db.refreshTokens.deleteMany({ userId }); + } +} + +// API endpoints +app.post("/api/auth/refresh", async (req, res) => { + const { refreshToken } = req.body; + try { + const { accessToken } = + await refreshTokenService.refreshAccessToken(refreshToken); + res.json({ accessToken }); + } catch (error) { + res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid refresh token" }); + } +}); + +app.post("/api/auth/logout", authenticate, async (req, res) => { + const { refreshToken } = req.body; + await refreshTokenService.revokeRefreshToken(refreshToken); + res.json({ message: "Logged out successfully" }); +}); +``` + +## Session-Based Authentication + +### Pattern 1: Express Session + +```typescript +import session from "express-session"; +import RedisStore from "connect-redis"; +import { createClient } from "redis"; + +// Setup Redis for session storage +const redisClient = createClient({ + url: process.env.REDIS_URL, +}); +await redisClient.connect(); + +app.use( + session({ + store: new RedisStore({ client: redisClient }), + secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!, + resave: false, + saveUninitialized: false, + cookie: { + secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production", // HTTPS only + httpOnly: true, // No JavaScript access + maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours + sameSite: "strict", // CSRF protection + }, + }), +); + +// Login +app.post("/api/auth/login", async (req, res) => { + const { email, password } = req.body; + + const user = await db.users.findOne({ email }); + if (!user || !(await verifyPassword(password, user.passwordHash))) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid credentials" }); + } + + // Store user in session + req.session.userId = user.id; + req.session.role = user.role; + + res.json({ user: { id: user.id, email: user.email, role: user.role } }); +}); + +// Session middleware +function requireAuth(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) { + if (!req.session.userId) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" }); + } + next(); +} + +// Protected route +app.get("/api/profile", requireAuth, async (req, res) => { + const user = await db.users.findById(req.session.userId); + res.json({ user }); +}); + +// Logout +app.post("/api/auth/logout", (req, res) => { + req.session.destroy((err) => { + if (err) { + return res.status(500).json({ error: "Logout failed" }); + } + res.clearCookie("connect.sid"); + res.json({ message: "Logged out successfully" }); + }); +}); +``` + +## OAuth2 / Social Login + +### Pattern 1: OAuth2 with Passport.js + +```typescript +import passport from "passport"; +import { Strategy as GoogleStrategy } from "passport-google-oauth20"; +import { Strategy as GitHubStrategy } from "passport-github2"; + +// Google OAuth +passport.use( + new GoogleStrategy( + { + clientID: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID!, + clientSecret: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET!, + callbackURL: "/api/auth/google/callback", + }, + async (accessToken, refreshToken, profile, done) => { + try { + // Find or create user + let user = await db.users.findOne({ + googleId: profile.id, + }); + + if (!user) { + user = await db.users.create({ + googleId: profile.id, + email: profile.emails?.[0]?.value, + name: profile.displayName, + avatar: profile.photos?.[0]?.value, + }); + } + + return done(null, user); + } catch (error) { + return done(error, undefined); + } + }, + ), +); + +// Routes +app.get( + "/api/auth/google", + passport.authenticate("google", { + scope: ["profile", "email"], + }), +); + +app.get( + "/api/auth/google/callback", + passport.authenticate("google", { session: false }), + (req, res) => { + // Generate JWT + const tokens = generateTokens(req.user.id, req.user.email, req.user.role); + // Redirect to frontend with token + res.redirect( + `${process.env.FRONTEND_URL}/auth/callback?token=${tokens.accessToken}`, + ); + }, +); +``` + +## Authorization Patterns + +### Pattern 1: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) + +```typescript +enum Role { + USER = "user", + MODERATOR = "moderator", + ADMIN = "admin", +} + +const roleHierarchy: Record = { + [Role.ADMIN]: [Role.ADMIN, Role.MODERATOR, Role.USER], + [Role.MODERATOR]: [Role.MODERATOR, Role.USER], + [Role.USER]: [Role.USER], +}; + +function hasRole(userRole: Role, requiredRole: Role): boolean { + return roleHierarchy[userRole].includes(requiredRole); +} + +// Middleware +function requireRole(...roles: Role[]) { + return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => { + if (!req.user) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" }); + } + + if (!roles.some((role) => hasRole(req.user.role, role))) { + return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" }); + } + + next(); + }; +} + +// Usage +app.delete( + "/api/users/:id", + authenticate, + requireRole(Role.ADMIN), + async (req, res) => { + // Only admins can delete users + await db.users.delete(req.params.id); + res.json({ message: "User deleted" }); + }, +); +``` + +### Pattern 2: Permission-Based Access Control + +```typescript +enum Permission { + READ_USERS = "read:users", + WRITE_USERS = "write:users", + DELETE_USERS = "delete:users", + READ_POSTS = "read:posts", + WRITE_POSTS = "write:posts", +} + +const rolePermissions: Record = { + [Role.USER]: [Permission.READ_POSTS, Permission.WRITE_POSTS], + [Role.MODERATOR]: [ + Permission.READ_POSTS, + Permission.WRITE_POSTS, + Permission.READ_USERS, + ], + [Role.ADMIN]: Object.values(Permission), +}; + +function hasPermission(userRole: Role, permission: Permission): boolean { + return rolePermissions[userRole]?.includes(permission) ?? false; +} + +function requirePermission(...permissions: Permission[]) { + return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => { + if (!req.user) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" }); + } + + const hasAllPermissions = permissions.every((permission) => + hasPermission(req.user.role, permission), + ); + + if (!hasAllPermissions) { + return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" }); + } + + next(); + }; +} + +// Usage +app.get( + "/api/users", + authenticate, + requirePermission(Permission.READ_USERS), + async (req, res) => { + const users = await db.users.findAll(); + res.json({ users }); + }, +); +``` + +### Pattern 3: Resource Ownership + +```typescript +// Check if user owns resource +async function requireOwnership( + resourceType: "post" | "comment", + resourceIdParam: string = "id", +) { + return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => { + if (!req.user) { + return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" }); + } + + const resourceId = req.params[resourceIdParam]; + + // Admins can access anything + if (req.user.role === Role.ADMIN) { + return next(); + } + + // Check ownership + let resource; + if (resourceType === "post") { + resource = await db.posts.findById(resourceId); + } else if (resourceType === "comment") { + resource = await db.comments.findById(resourceId); + } + + if (!resource) { + return res.status(404).json({ error: "Resource not found" }); + } + + if (resource.userId !== req.user.userId) { + return res.status(403).json({ error: "Not authorized" }); + } + + next(); + }; +} + +// Usage +app.put( + "/api/posts/:id", + authenticate, + requireOwnership("post"), + async (req, res) => { + // User can only update their own posts + const post = await db.posts.update(req.params.id, req.body); + res.json({ post }); + }, +); +``` + +## Security Best Practices + +### Pattern 1: Password Security + +```typescript +import bcrypt from "bcrypt"; +import { z } from "zod"; + +// Password validation schema +const passwordSchema = z + .string() + .min(12, "Password must be at least 12 characters") + .regex(/[A-Z]/, "Password must contain uppercase letter") + .regex(/[a-z]/, "Password must contain lowercase letter") + .regex(/[0-9]/, "Password must contain number") + .regex(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/, "Password must contain special character"); + +// Hash password +async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise { + const saltRounds = 12; // 2^12 iterations + return bcrypt.hash(password, saltRounds); +} + +// Verify password +async function verifyPassword( + password: string, + hash: string, +): Promise { + return bcrypt.compare(password, hash); +} + +// Registration with password validation +app.post("/api/auth/register", async (req, res) => { + try { + const { email, password } = req.body; + + // Validate password + passwordSchema.parse(password); + + // Check if user exists + const existingUser = await db.users.findOne({ email }); + if (existingUser) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: "Email already registered" }); + } + + // Hash password + const passwordHash = await hashPassword(password); + + // Create user + const user = await db.users.create({ + email, + passwordHash, + }); + + // Generate tokens + const tokens = generateTokens(user.id, user.email, user.role); + + res.status(201).json({ + user: { id: user.id, email: user.email }, + ...tokens, + }); + } catch (error) { + if (error instanceof z.ZodError) { + return res.status(400).json({ error: error.errors[0].message }); + } + res.status(500).json({ error: "Registration failed" }); + } +}); +``` + +### Pattern 2: Rate Limiting + +```typescript +import rateLimit from "express-rate-limit"; +import RedisStore from "rate-limit-redis"; + +// Login rate limiter +const loginLimiter = rateLimit({ + store: new RedisStore({ client: redisClient }), + windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes + max: 5, // 5 attempts + message: "Too many login attempts, please try again later", + standardHeaders: true, + legacyHeaders: false, +}); + +// API rate limiter +const apiLimiter = rateLimit({ + windowMs: 60 * 1000, // 1 minute + max: 100, // 100 requests per minute + standardHeaders: true, +}); + +// Apply to routes +app.post("/api/auth/login", loginLimiter, async (req, res) => { + // Login logic +}); + +app.use("/api/", apiLimiter); +``` + +## Best Practices + +1. **Never Store Plain Passwords**: Always hash with bcrypt/argon2 +2. **Use HTTPS**: Encrypt data in transit +3. **Short-Lived Access Tokens**: 15-30 minutes max +4. **Secure Cookies**: httpOnly, secure, sameSite flags +5. **Validate All Input**: Email format, password strength +6. **Rate Limit Auth Endpoints**: Prevent brute force attacks +7. **Implement CSRF Protection**: For session-based auth +8. **Rotate Secrets Regularly**: JWT secrets, session secrets +9. **Log Security Events**: Login attempts, failed auth +10. **Use MFA When Possible**: Extra security layer + +## Common Pitfalls + +- **Weak Passwords**: Enforce strong password policies +- **JWT in localStorage**: Vulnerable to XSS, use httpOnly cookies +- **No Token Expiration**: Tokens should expire +- **Client-Side Auth Checks Only**: Always validate server-side +- **Insecure Password Reset**: Use secure tokens with expiration +- **No Rate Limiting**: Vulnerable to brute force +- **Trusting Client Data**: Always validate on server diff --git a/.claude/skills/broken-authentication/.openskills.json b/.claude/skills/broken-authentication/.openskills.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62540f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/broken-authentication/.openskills.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "source": "/tmp/skill-selector-curated-3423638041", + "sourceType": "local", + "localPath": "/tmp/skill-selector-curated-3423638041/broken-authentication", + "installedAt": "2026-04-07T00:45:24.780Z" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.claude/skills/broken-authentication/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/broken-authentication/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db8b8d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/broken-authentication/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,480 @@ +--- +name: broken-authentication +description: "Identify and exploit authentication and session management vulnerabilities in web applications. Broken authentication consistently ranks in the OWASP Top 10 and can lead to account takeover, identity theft, and unauthorized access to sensitive systems." +risk: unknown +source: community +author: zebbern +date_added: "2026-02-27" +--- + +# Broken Authentication Testing + +## Purpose + +Identify and exploit authentication and session management vulnerabilities in web applications. Broken authentication consistently ranks in the OWASP Top 10 and can lead to account takeover, identity theft, and unauthorized access to sensitive systems. This skill covers testing methodologies for password policies, session handling, multi-factor authentication, and credential management. + +## Prerequisites + +### Required Knowledge +- HTTP protocol and session mechanisms +- Authentication types (SFA, 2FA, MFA) +- Cookie and token handling +- Common authentication frameworks + +### Required Tools +- Burp Suite Professional or Community +- Hydra or similar brute-force tools +- Custom wordlists for credential testing +- Browser developer tools + +### Required Access +- Target application URL +- Test account credentials +- Written authorization for testing + +## Outputs and Deliverables + +1. **Authentication Assessment Report** - Document all identified vulnerabilities +2. **Credential Testing Results** - Brute-force and dictionary attack outcomes +3. **Session Security Analysis** - Token randomness and timeout evaluation +4. **Remediation Recommendations** - Security hardening guidance + +## Core Workflow + +### Phase 1: Authentication Mechanism Analysis + +Understand the application's authentication architecture: + +``` +# Identify authentication type +- Password-based (forms, basic auth, digest) +- Token-based (JWT, OAuth, API keys) +- Certificate-based (mutual TLS) +- Multi-factor (SMS, TOTP, hardware tokens) + +# Map authentication endpoints +/login, /signin, /authenticate +/register, /signup +/forgot-password, /reset-password +/logout, /signout +/api/auth/*, /oauth/* +``` + +Capture and analyze authentication requests: + +```http +POST /login HTTP/1.1 +Host: target.com +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded + +username=test&password=test123 +``` + +### Phase 2: Password Policy Testing + +Evaluate password requirements and enforcement: + +```bash +# Test minimum length (a, ab, abcdefgh) +# Test complexity (password, password1, Password1!) +# Test common weak passwords (123456, password, qwerty, admin) +# Test username as password (admin/admin, test/test) +``` + +Document policy gaps: Minimum length <8, no complexity, common passwords allowed, username as password. + +### Phase 3: Credential Enumeration + +Test for username enumeration vulnerabilities: + +```bash +# Compare responses for valid vs invalid usernames +# Invalid: "Invalid username" vs Valid: "Invalid password" +# Check timing differences, response codes, registration messages +``` + +# Password reset +"Email sent if account exists" (secure) +"No account with that email" (leaks info) + +# API responses +{"error": "user_not_found"} +{"error": "invalid_password"} +``` + +### Phase 4: Brute Force Testing + +Test account lockout and rate limiting: + +```bash +# Using Hydra for form-based auth +hydra -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt \ + target.com http-post-form \ + "/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Invalid credentials" + +# Using Burp Intruder +1. Capture login request +2. Send to Intruder +3. Set payload positions on password field +4. Load wordlist +5. Start attack +6. Analyze response lengths/codes +``` + +Check for protections: + +```bash +# Account lockout +- After how many attempts? +- Duration of lockout? +- Lockout notification? + +# Rate limiting +- Requests per minute limit? +- IP-based or account-based? +- Bypass via headers (X-Forwarded-For)? + +# CAPTCHA +- After failed attempts? +- Easily bypassable? +``` + +### Phase 5: Credential Stuffing + +Test with known breached credentials: + +```bash +# Credential stuffing differs from brute force +# Uses known email:password pairs from breaches + +# Using Burp Intruder with Pitchfork attack +1. Set username and password as positions +2. Load email list as payload 1 +3. Load password list as payload 2 (matched pairs) +4. Analyze for successful logins + +# Detection evasion +- Slow request rate +- Rotate source IPs +- Randomize user agents +- Add delays between attempts +``` + +### Phase 6: Session Management Testing + +Analyze session token security: + +```bash +# Capture session cookie +Cookie: SESSIONID=abc123def456 + +# Test token characteristics +1. Entropy - Is it random enough? +2. Length - Sufficient length (128+ bits)? +3. Predictability - Sequential patterns? +4. Secure flags - HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite? +``` + +Session token analysis: + +```python +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +import requests +import hashlib + +# Collect multiple session tokens +tokens = [] +for i in range(100): + response = requests.get("https://target.com/login") + token = response.cookies.get("SESSIONID") + tokens.append(token) + +# Analyze for patterns +# Check for sequential increments +# Calculate entropy +# Look for timestamp components +``` + +### Phase 7: Session Fixation Testing + +Test if session is regenerated after authentication: + +```bash +# Step 1: Get session before login +GET /login HTTP/1.1 +Response: Set-Cookie: SESSIONID=abc123 + +# Step 2: Login with same session +POST /login HTTP/1.1 +Cookie: SESSIONID=abc123 +username=valid&password=valid + +# Step 3: Check if session changed +# VULNERABLE if SESSIONID remains abc123 +# SECURE if new session assigned after login +``` + +Attack scenario: + +```bash +# Attacker workflow: +1. Attacker visits site, gets session: SESSIONID=attacker_session +2. Attacker sends link to victim with fixed session: + https://target.com/login?SESSIONID=attacker_session +3. Victim logs in with attacker's session +4. Attacker now has authenticated session +``` + +### Phase 8: Session Timeout Testing + +Verify session expiration policies: + +```bash +# Test idle timeout +1. Login and note session cookie +2. Wait without activity (15, 30, 60 minutes) +3. Attempt to use session +4. Check if session is still valid + +# Test absolute timeout +1. Login and continuously use session +2. Check if forced logout after set period (8 hours, 24 hours) + +# Test logout functionality +1. Login and note session +2. Click logout +3. Attempt to reuse old session cookie +4. Session should be invalidated server-side +``` + +### Phase 9: Multi-Factor Authentication Testing + +Assess MFA implementation security: + +```bash +# OTP brute force +- 4-digit OTP = 10,000 combinations +- 6-digit OTP = 1,000,000 combinations +- Test rate limiting on OTP endpoint + +# OTP bypass techniques +- Skip MFA step by direct URL access +- Modify response to indicate MFA passed +- Null/empty OTP submission +- Previous valid OTP reuse + +# API Version Downgrade Attack (crAPI example) +# If /api/v3/check-otp has rate limiting, try older versions: +POST /api/v2/check-otp +{"otp": "1234"} +# Older API versions may lack security controls + +# Using Burp for OTP testing +1. Capture OTP verification request +2. Send to Intruder +3. Set OTP field as payload position +4. Use numbers payload (0000-9999) +5. Check for successful bypass +``` + +Test MFA enrollment: + +```bash +# Forced enrollment +- Can MFA be skipped during setup? +- Can backup codes be accessed without verification? + +# Recovery process +- Can MFA be disabled via email alone? +- Social engineering potential? +``` + +### Phase 10: Password Reset Testing + +Analyze password reset security: + +```bash +# Token security +1. Request password reset +2. Capture reset link +3. Analyze token: + - Length and randomness + - Expiration time + - Single-use enforcement + - Account binding + +# Token manipulation +https://target.com/reset?token=abc123&user=victim +# Try changing user parameter while using valid token + +# Host header injection +POST /forgot-password HTTP/1.1 +Host: attacker.com +email=victim@email.com +# Reset email may contain attacker's domain +``` + +## Quick Reference + +### Common Vulnerability Types + +| Vulnerability | Risk | Test Method | +|--------------|------|-------------| +| Weak passwords | High | Policy testing, dictionary attack | +| No lockout | High | Brute force testing | +| Username enumeration | Medium | Differential response analysis | +| Session fixation | High | Pre/post-login session comparison | +| Weak session tokens | High | Entropy analysis | +| No session timeout | Medium | Long-duration session testing | +| Insecure password reset | High | Token analysis, workflow bypass | +| MFA bypass | Critical | Direct access, response manipulation | + +### Credential Testing Payloads + +```bash +# Default credentials +admin:admin +admin:password +admin:123456 +root:root +test:test +user:user + +# Common passwords +123456 +password +12345678 +qwerty +abc123 +password1 +admin123 + +# Breached credential databases +- Have I Been Pwned dataset +- SecLists passwords +- Custom targeted lists +``` + +### Session Cookie Flags + +| Flag | Purpose | Vulnerability if Missing | +|------|---------|------------------------| +| HttpOnly | Prevent JS access | XSS can steal session | +| Secure | HTTPS only | Sent over HTTP | +| SameSite | CSRF protection | Cross-site requests allowed | +| Path | URL scope | Broader exposure | +| Domain | Domain scope | Subdomain access | +| Expires | Lifetime | Persistent sessions | + +### Rate Limiting Bypass Headers + +```http +X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 +X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 +X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1 +X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1 +X-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1 +True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1 +``` + +## Constraints and Limitations + +### Legal Requirements +- Only test with explicit written authorization +- Avoid testing with real breached credentials +- Do not access actual user accounts +- Document all testing activities + +### Technical Limitations +- CAPTCHA may prevent automated testing +- Rate limiting affects brute force timing +- MFA significantly increases attack difficulty +- Some vulnerabilities require victim interaction + +### Scope Considerations +- Test accounts may behave differently than production +- Some features may be disabled in test environments +- Third-party authentication may be out of scope +- Production testing requires extra caution + +## Examples + +### Example 1: Account Lockout Bypass + +**Scenario:** Test if account lockout can be bypassed + +```bash +# Step 1: Identify lockout threshold +# Try 5 wrong passwords for admin account +# Result: "Account locked for 30 minutes" + +# Step 2: Test bypass via IP rotation +# Use X-Forwarded-For header +POST /login HTTP/1.1 +X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.1.1 +username=admin&password=attempt1 + +# Increment IP for each attempt +X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.1.2 +# Continue until successful or confirmed blocked + +# Step 3: Test bypass via case manipulation +username=Admin (vs admin) +username=ADMIN +# Some systems treat these as different accounts +``` + +### Example 2: JWT Token Attack + +**Scenario:** Exploit weak JWT implementation + +```bash +# Step 1: Capture JWT token +Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyIjoidGVzdCJ9.signature + +# Step 2: Decode and analyze +# Header: {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} +# Payload: {"user":"test","role":"user"} + +# Step 3: Try "none" algorithm attack +# Change header to: {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"} +# Remove signature +eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJ1c2VyIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4ifQ. + +# Step 4: Submit modified token +Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJ1c2VyIjoiYWRtaW4ifQ. +``` + +### Example 3: Password Reset Token Exploitation + +**Scenario:** Test password reset functionality + +```bash +# Step 1: Request reset for test account +POST /forgot-password +email=test@example.com + +# Step 2: Capture reset link +https://target.com/reset?token=a1b2c3d4e5f6 + +# Step 3: Test token properties +# Reuse: Try using same token twice +# Expiration: Wait 24+ hours and retry +# Modification: Change characters in token + +# Step 4: Test for user parameter manipulation +https://target.com/reset?token=a1b2c3d4e5f6&email=admin@example.com +# Check if admin's password can be reset with test user's token +``` + +## Troubleshooting + +| Issue | Solutions | +|-------|-----------| +| Brute force too slow | Identify rate limit scope; IP rotation; add delays; use targeted wordlists | +| Session analysis inconclusive | Collect 1000+ tokens; use statistical tools; check for timestamps; compare accounts | +| MFA cannot be bypassed | Document as secure; test backup/recovery mechanisms; check MFA fatigue; verify enrollment | +| Account lockout prevents testing | Request multiple test accounts; test threshold first; use slower timing | + +## When to Use +This skill is applicable to execute the workflow or actions described in the overview. diff --git a/.claude/skills/bun-development/.openskills.json b/.claude/skills/bun-development/.openskills.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8467a88 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/bun-development/.openskills.json @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +{ + "source": "/tmp/skill-selector-curated-3423638041", + "sourceType": "local", + "localPath": "/tmp/skill-selector-curated-3423638041/bun-development", + "installedAt": "2026-04-07T00:45:24.781Z" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.claude/skills/bun-development/SKILL.md b/.claude/skills/bun-development/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02298fc --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude/skills/bun-development/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,696 @@ +--- +name: bun-development +description: "Fast, modern JavaScript/TypeScript development with the Bun runtime, inspired by [oven-sh/bun](https://github.com/oven-sh/bun)." +risk: critical +source: community +date_added: "2026-02-27" +--- + + + +# ⚡ Bun Development + +> Fast, modern JavaScript/TypeScript development with the Bun runtime, inspired by [oven-sh/bun](https://github.com/oven-sh/bun). + +## When to Use This Skill + +Use this skill when: + +- Starting new JS/TS projects with Bun +- Migrating from Node.js to Bun +- Optimizing development speed +- Using Bun's built-in tools (bundler, test runner) +- Troubleshooting Bun-specific issues + +--- + +## 1. Getting Started + +### 1.1 Installation + +```bash +# macOS / Linux +curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash + +# Windows +powershell -c "irm bun.sh/install.ps1 | iex" + +# Homebrew +brew tap oven-sh/bun +brew install bun + +# npm (if needed) +npm install -g bun + +# Upgrade +bun upgrade +``` + +### 1.2 Why Bun? + +| Feature | Bun | Node.js | +| :-------------- | :------------- | :-------------------------- | +| Startup time | ~25ms | ~100ms+ | +| Package install | 10-100x faster | Baseline | +| TypeScript | Native | Requires transpiler | +| JSX | Native | Requires transpiler | +| Test runner | Built-in | External (Jest, Vitest) | +| Bundler | Built-in | External (Webpack, esbuild) | + +--- + +## 2. Project Setup + +### 2.1 Create New Project + +```bash +# Initialize project +bun init + +# Creates: +# ├── package.json +# ├── tsconfig.json +# ├── index.ts +# └── README.md + +# With specific template +bun create